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JOHN V. KRUTILLA* and MICHAEL D. BOWES**

Economics and Public Forestland
Management* * *
INTRODUCTION
There are a number of significant elements associated with the management of public forestland, four of which serve as a backdrop for this
paper:
(1) In the United States the public domain lands which are managed
by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the national forests
managed by the Forest Service (USFS), are required by law to provide
a number of forest outputs: domestic livestock grazing, recreation, timber,
waterflow, wildlife, and wilderness. Moreover, in both the National Forest
Management Act (NFMA),' and the regulations which were issued pursuant thereto, 2 management for biological diversity was included in a
way that was not apparent in the earlier Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act.3 Given that some of these outputs are public goods and others are
non-priced outputs for reasons of law, policy, or tradition, these mandates
must be implemented without the market signal guidance that is available
to managers of private property resources for producing purely private
goods;
(2) Because of this mix of public goods, extra market, and marketable
forest outputs that public lands are expected to supply, the task of devising
the criteria for implementing an economically efficient management of
public forestlands is incredibly complex. It may be too difficult to accomplish even if general public interest existed in economically efficient
outcomes from the management of public lands. Such economic criteria
require a great deal of exacting information which does not yet exist.
Land managers need information concerning forest resources both in terms
of the real cost of their supply, and the economic demand for them.
Absent such information, public land managers must continue to apply
administrative criteria, and indeed political criteria, to resolve the problem
of allocating lands and selecting forest management practices required to
*Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future (now retired).
**Fellow, Resources for the Future.
***Much of the substance of this paper was presented in briefer form as the Thompson Memorial
Lecture, School of Forestry, Northern Arizona University, April 6, 1988.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1982).
2. 36 C. FR. §219 (1988).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§528-531 (1982).
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produce an acceptable mix of forest resource commodities and services.
The intense conflict over who gets what may become bitter, even unseemly, but escaping the conflict is wishful thinking;
(3) We have to acknowledge that the public lands exist in this predominantly private property, market oriented, private enterprise society
because of explicit national legislation, policy, and a tradition that says
private property and market economics "aren't all that matters." These
lands are regarded as public interest conservation lands which are also
part of the national heritage, and are likely to remain public because there
is overwhelming public support for this arrangement. Accordingly, we
can resign ourselves to expect tension over the disposition of public land
resources wherever there is a decision being made about them. And the
outcome will not be judged primarily on whether the results are economically efficient, but rather on whether the process by which the result was
reached was fair. That does not mean, however, that the advocacy of
economic efficiency has a lesser role to play than the advocacy of any
other criterion in the matrix of public interests; and
(4) Congress has put in place an elaborate body of law directing the
public land managers to implement both a general philosophy as well as
more specific management concepts. Congress also is the body that provides the appropriations to fund these management activities. It is incumbent on Congress, therefore, to conduct its budgeting and appropriations
process in a way that does not require management actions at variance
with actions directed by its management legislation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN FOREST MANAGEMENT
Martin Faustmann, the father of forest economics, published in 1849
his solution to the economically optimal timber harvesting schedule. 4 The
work is truly remarkable not only because he provided correct analysis
of a central timber management problem, but equally because of its
continuing widespread, even if sometimes unsuspecting, application in
forest economics and policy analysis. To understand this we need the
help of Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson.
As part of an elegant paper on forest economics, Nobel Laureate Paul
Samuelson demonstrated that Faustmann's analysis was perfectly consistent with neoclassical theory of efficient resource allocation.' That
Faustmann's work was consistent with current resource allocation theory
4. Faustmann, On the Determination of the Value Which Forest Land and Immature Stands Possess
for Forestry, in Martin Faustmann and the Evolution of Discounted Cash Flow 18 (M. Gand ed.
1968) (trans. W. Linard) (Oxford Univ. Commonwealth Forestry Institute Paper 42).
5. Samuelson, Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society, 14 Economic Inquiry 466 (1976).
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was all the more remarkable because his work was published within a
year of John Stuart Mill's, Principles of Political Economy, the most
mature developed statement in the classical economics tradition. Although
Faustmann worked around the middle of the last century, he was nonetheless one of us. Or more properly put, most of us are one of him.
Classical economics addressed the trilogy of production; namely, land,
labor and capital. On the other hand, neoclassical theory developed elements of modern marginal theory which has been a notable advance,
mostly more useful, and certainly more analytically powerful. In the
process of development, however, the category of land, which was a
code word for natural resources, was dropped from explicit consideration.
Neoclassical theory dealt with the behavior of economic agents which
were, for all practical purposes, firms and households; it was an extension
and elaboration of the theory of supply and demand in marginalist terms.
Absent from the theory was a treatment of natural resources and the
public sector. Failure of neoclassical theory to concern itself with these
two areas is of unique relevance for the analyses of policy prescriptions
that we latter-day Faustmannites are likely to make.
We need to recall the assumptions on which neoclassical resource
allocation theory is based in order to appreciate why addressing the conditions of production and utilization of natural resource services is indispensable to a theory of efficient resource allocation. Neoclassical
allocation theory demonstrates that, if at the margin the costs and gains
from any transaction are equal, then no movement away from this condition can benefit one party without simultaneously reducing benefits to
the other. If such marginal conditions are met in all markets for all goods
and factor services, it follows that no alternative allocation of resources
could increase the value of goods and services that are thus produced and
consumed given the resource endowment, the state of technology and the
pool of labor with its mix of skills. Actually, although not known at the
time to English-speaking economists, it can be argued that the great
Swedish economist Wicksel recognized that the efficiency of the allocation
of resources was also dependent on the particular distribution of income. 6
Interestingly, the institutional mechanism for approximating these results exists for many goods and services in markets for such transactions.
We have to understand, however, the conditions that need to hold in order
for these economic efficiency results to occur.
We can summarize these as a set of three conditions:
1. All of the value of a factor service (inputs) and all of its cost must
be fully and exclusively reflected in its market price. There can be
no direct interdependence among production functions;
6. 1 K. Wicksel, Lectures in Political Economy 77 (. Robins 2d ed. 1934).
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2. All of the utility a consumer obtains from a consumer good or
service purchased in a competitive market is enjoyed only by the
one who consumes it. There is no interdependence between utility
functions;
3. There is no interdependence between production and utility functions.
In summary, all the costs and gains associated with production are
assumed to be mediated by markets in which firms-participate, and all
the costs and gains associated with transactions between firms and households are similarly mediated by markets in which there are no spillover
effects that escape being reflected in market prices.
The direct or physical interdependencies are thus termed to distinguish
them from market mediated transactions. They are also referred to by
other terms. In a more legalistic frame of reference they are referred to
as "third party effects" to distinguish them from the two parties to a
transaction. In other contexts they may be referred to as external economies and diseconomies, or simply externalities.
Is the absence of such interdependencies very important? If one wishes
to argue for the efficacy of "the market," then one is assuming, whether
knowingly or unwittingly, that such conditions do hold in the relevant
markets in the workaday world. Moreover, when one conducts analyses
based on the garden-variety allocation theory, these conditions must hold
in reality for one's policy prescriptions to merit respect.
The neoclassical economists were generally comfortable with these
assumptions. They had a difficult time in finding convincing examples
of externalities. One potential externality which they considered was soot
deposited by a coal-burning manufacturing plant on laundry hung out to
dry. Another example offered was one in which grass fires were started
by locomotives, but the most interesting example was that of honey bees
helping pollinate orchards to the benefit of the latters' owners. Generally
speaking, the kinds of things they were able to muster were considered
of such insignificance that externalities were called "Edgeworth's empty
economic boxes" after the economist who had introduced the concept.
It is understandable that such a viewpoint existed during the last quarter
of the last century. However, it has persisted into the last half of this
century as well. Indeed, in Scitovsky's 1954 article entitled Two Concepts
of External Economies, he dismissed the importance of externalities of
the sort that we have mentioned (static externalities). 7 The soot and drying
laundry type of externalities, he argued, are being handled satisfactorily
by urban ordinances, and any others, in his opinion, must be sought along
"bucolic" byways. They, by implication, are also unimportant.
7. Scitovsky, 7Vvo Concepts of External Economies, 62 J. Pol. Econ. 70 (1954).
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It becomes clear upon reflection that much of our garden-variety applications of resource allocation theory in the natural resources field are
unencumbered by awareness of relevant direct interdependence complications.' Moreover, most, if not all, of our policy prescriptions draw for
their intellectual authority and theoretical validity on a body of thought
which after a hundred years still remains innocent of pervasive market
failure owing to direct interdependencies.
But is the failure to recognize direct interdependencies in the natural
resources field and to reflect their existence in our policy prescriptions a
serious matter? To answer this question we could profit by asking ourselves:
1. Would the dumping, or even accidental escape, of mine/mill tailings
into a stream impinge on the value of the water downstream to a
food processing plant drawing on the stream for its source of water?
If it would, we have an example of direct interdependence between
the production functions of two fiscally independent firms. Here
we have a negative externality, or an external diseconomy. Furthermore, since the mining venture, if unrestrained, avoids part of
its real costs, the markets which are involved fail to provide efficient
resource allocation signals;
2. Would the construction of a dam and reservoir that would flood the
Grand Canyon affect the enjoyment of current users of the National
Park? If it would, we have an example of direct interdependence
between a production function and consumer utility functions. Unless it were required of the hydroelectric firm to fully compensate
the park visitors in some way, the market that establishes the price
of power would understate its real cost and overstate its relative
value; and
3. Would permitting all-terrain vehicles the use of trails now used
exclusively by backpackers affect the enjoyment experienced by
backpackers? If it would, we have an example of interdependence
of utility functions.
One could go on indefinitely giving examples of interdependencies or
externalities in the natural resources field. Direct interdependence is the
stuff of which natural resources management is made. This phenomenon
is exactly what has given rise to the concerns of conservationists and
environmentalists, and is part of the reason for the hostility these groups
have had toward boiler plate economic studies. These direct interdependencies are also responsible for the multiple use and biological diversity
8. Examples of such momentary lapses of concentration can be found in: Clawson, The National
Forests, 191 Sci. 766 (1976); Hyde & Krutilla, The Question of Development or Restricted Use of
Alaska's InteriorForests, 13 Annals Regional Sci. 1 (1979); Nelson, The Public Lands, in Current
Issues in Natural Resource Policy 14 (P. Portney ed. 1982).
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provisions of public land policy and management legislation. Thus to
answer the question: "Does failing to take the interdependencies into
account in resource allocation and policy analyses in the natural resources
field invalidate the conclusions of such studies?" One would be foolish
to accept such studies at face value.
However, let us not lose sight of Martin Faustmann.9 Following Paul
Samuelson, we know that any conclusions of a study by Faustmann would
be just as authoritative as those we are likely to provide when relying
implicitly, and often unwittingly, on the neoclassical theory of efficient
resource allocation. Even less flattering to current policy analysts in this
field is that any forest economic policy prescription we make innocent
of the interdependencies is no better than Faustmann could have prescribed as authoritatively almost a century and a half ago. While this
may be surprising to many of us, the question remains as to whether that
is good or bad. It depends a great deal on what one wants to do or believes
oneself to be doing.
Neoclassical resource allocation theory assumed away interdependencies. In Faustmann's world, the timber stands are independent except
perhaps in a permissible market sense. His analysis addresses the economics of the rotation of a single timber stand, or a combination of
independent stands in various stages of maturity whose growth and harvest
do not affect directly or biologically the growth and harvest of adjacent
stands. Moreover, it addresses only the matter of producing timber from
the land. Accordingly, its results can be generalized only to the management of land for a single purpose, namely, timber production. Was that
necessarily bad? Not for Martin Faustmann. The type of land he was
addressing was not open to the public for various public purposes. In
these circumstances, a single stand or even a multiple but independent
stand model of management for a single use, is quite appropriate.
Then is it necessarily bad to use Faustmann's analysis even if camouflaged by the parlance of modem economics?
I. The owner or manager of a private industrial forest can do no better
than follow Faustmann's economic prescriptions. In fact, he is probably already doing so even if he has never heard of Faustmann.
After all, this German forester's prescriptions are completely compatible with profitable modem commercial timber growing.
2. A public land manager operating under the NFMA or the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)'0 will find Faustmann
the source of much of his misery. Fortunately, there is no need for
9. Faustmann, supra note 4.
10. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982), clarifies
the authority for multiple-use management on BLM lands.
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public land managers to rely on Faustmann. The reason is given
below.
3. A competent policy advisor who deserves to be consulted, is required by professional responsibility to check out carefully that
one's prescriptions do not rely for intellectual authority and theoretical validity only on the garden-variety theory of efficient resource
allocation. Samuelson volunteers that the results of the analysis he
presented would not necessarily be a useful guide for multiple use
management." And he is correct; it is not.
WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US?
Fortunately we are not faced with the choice between throwing up our
hands in despair or going blind. An alternative provides a reformulated
theory of efficient resource allocation that addresses explicitly the issues
arising in the field of multiple use management of public forestland. 2 In
the rest of this paper we first outline the uniquely relevant conditions that
require acknowledging the direct interdependences in the production of
forest outputs. We then explain the resource allocation theory that takes
these into account. Finally, we will comment on the extent to which the
first generation of national forest plans addresses these issues.
The law requires the national forest and BLM lands to be managed for
multiple uses. The forest outputs include grazing, recreation, timber,
watershed conditions, diversity of wildlife, and wilderness. The Forest
Service and BLM accordingly must endeavor to establish the conditions
on the land that will provide for both market and extra-market outputs.
The mandate to provide a diversity of wildlife requires a diversity of
habitats. The requirement to maintain openings in the forest with appropriate residual stands may be compatible with a number of other management objectives, from managing snow for augmenting waterflow to
timber management.
What is described is an interdependence of sites. Wildlife needs forage
and adjacent cover. 3 The attractiveness of a campground is not unaffected
by the standing timber on adjacent sites. The production of multiple
11.

Samuelson, supra note 5, at 487.
12. Bowes & Krutilla, Multiple Use Management of Public Forest Lands, in 2 Handbook of
Natural Resources and Energy Economics 531 (1985).
13. But c.f., Wilcove, From Fragmentation to Extinction, 7 Nat. Areas J.(1987). David Wilcove
draws attention to the threat of extinction for some species which require large continuous reaches
of habitat (e.g., the Red Cockaded Woodpecker) when habitat modification takes place to increase
the population of ubiquitous species (e.g., deer). Sensitivity to the hazards of fragmenting habitat
of scarce, localized, and thus, potentially endangered species in order to increase populations of
ubiquitous species, it is alleged, is often honored in the breach on public forest lands. This point
bears mentioning, although more extensive discussion is outside the scope of this paper
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outputs from a forest depends on land management practices in coordinated application to a collection of interdependent sites. Attention to site
interdependencies is the key to successful multiple use management of
forestlands. Faustmann economics ignores the interrelationship of sites
because it does not deal with the production of multiple forest resource
services that are called for in existing public land management legislation.
A proper analysis of the efficient allocation of public forestland resource
services requires an analytic model that incorporates a diversity of interactive sites. A formal model that presents such an analytic apparatus has
been developed by Michael Bowes."4 Some of the differences expected
from analyses using the garden-variety resource allocation model and
using Bowes' multiple interdependent site model are summarized below.
It is important to recognize that multiple stands, as well as a single
stand, can be managed for a single use. However, economically efficient
multiple use management cannot be achieved effectively without considering multiple stands, appropriate distribution of age classes, and other
attributes of a biologically diversified forest condition.
The findings summarized here are produced from a dynamic optimization, multiple-stand model, and contrast the results from management
for timber alone with results when the model is applied to management
for multiple objectives. Both cases use the same set of sites facing identical
initial conditions. While the results are specific to particular applications
of the model, they are suggestive of the potential richness in multiple
use management that has not been made apparent in previous analytical
treatments of the economics of forest management.
At sufficiently low timber prices, continuous timber management might
be found to be uneconomic. More precisely, under single-use timber
management we find that all our initially stocked sites should be immediately harvested and then abandoned with no artificial regeneration
and with no further timber management. Under multiple-use management
there is a greater likelihood of regeneration and continuing harvest. The
amenity value of standing timber, and of stand age diversity, encourages
the continuing management of the timber resource. Even at very low
timber prices, some level of harvest is then desirable, because harvesting
represents an effective means of manipulating vegetation for improved
wildlife habitat and amenity values. In general, on public land, occasional
timber sales below cost and timber management can be justified economically on the basis of the long-term improvement in multiple-use value
that may result from harvesting.
At high timber prices we find as expected, that the full multiple-use
solution corresponds quite closely to the timber management solution.
However, even with the high timber values, there are often subtle effects
14. Bowes & Krutilla, supra note 12, at 542.

Summer 1989]

ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC FORESTLAND MANAGEMENT

745

on the harvest schedule that result from considering the full mix of multiple-use values. If we begin with a forest area of fairly uniform stand
age, it can prove advantageous, particularly in the initial decades, to
delay some harvesting or to delay the regeneration of a stand in order to
introduce a more diverse age distribution. These means of introducing
diversity in the age mix of stands impose little financial cost (particularly
the delay in artificial regeneration) and can sometimes significantly improve the flow of amenity values.
In general, there is no easy description of the effect that consideration
of multiple use values will have upon the scheduling of timber harvests.
Analytical work based on the single stand model has led many to conclude
that multiple-use values are best met by the implementation of longer
rotation periods than would be desired under management for timber
alone. At least this seems to be true when older stands are preferred for
their amenity value. In contrast, in Bowes' multiple interdependent stand
examples, the benefit of maintaining some balance in the mix of age
classes makes the optimal harvest timing very dependent upon the current
conditions, for example, the specific age classes in the set of stands of
the forest area. Harvest schedules, especially in the initial few decades
of multiple-use management regimes, can be very complex. Younger
stands might be indicated for harvesting while older stands are left unharvested. Also, a higher relative recreational value does not necessarily
lead to a longer rotation, even when older stands are generally preferred
for their amenity values. Instead one might see an increasing percentage
of the area set aside as protected old growth while a short timber rotation
is instituted on the remaining sites in the management unit. One may find
such solutions even when the management area is perfectly homogeneous.
Such harvest solutions could not be found if the stands were considered
independently.
The benefits from diversity of standing stock may lead to the allocation
of the forest in a manner that looks like specialization of functions by
land areas. This seems to be the case when the manager elects to preserve
some stable stands of old growth indefinitely while harvesting other stands
on short timber rotation. However, it is important to note that this specialization has resulted from the application of the multiple-use model,
and does not correspond to the solution that might result if land were
initially allocated to serve specific functions. Specialization of land use
is often likely to result in more effective production of such services as
wildlife and increased waterflow than would be possible from uniform
management of land areas. One related result is the potential advantage
from the specialization of use over time, rather than location. These
complex harvest solutions contrast strongly with the simple harvest schedules that result from single, or independent, stand models.
The differences that we have described in timber management under
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economically efficient multiple-use management of interdependent sites,
as compared to a single stand timber solution, can be expected in connection with the various multiple-use values which depend on the diversity
of the forest condition. With sufficiently high values attached to the
nontimber services, the improvement of the age mix or other attributes
of the forest condition may determine completely the timing of the harvest.
The complexity of the harvest solution is due to the expected nonlinearity
of the nontimber benefit function across the individual sites.
FORESTLAND PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES
Moving from the policy analysis and prescriptions to forest level planning and management, a pragmatic variant of a multiple-stand site-interactive model has been used in the round of national forest planning
just concluded. This is a large linear programming model referred to as
FORPLAN, which is structured to address selected problems in forest
planning. Given the great frustration encountered on the forests using
FORPLAN, a question frequently asked is whether FORPLAN is the
right analytic approach to the problem. Many with experience in the field
think not, but not everyone agrees that many of the problems in applying
FORPLAN were the result of the first introduction of field-level analysts
to the model, and that underlying data required for satisfactory analysis
did not exist. The results, while not universally celebrated, were nonetheless useful.
The information required in forest planning is the change in a forest
resource in response to an incremental change in management inputs.
Because this kind of information is often very difficult to obtain, there
has been substantial uncertainty concerning the value of biophysical responses to changes in management activities. In wildlife habitat management and population numbers, the response to vegetation management
is just becoming well enough understood to attempt quantitative estimates
in modeling activity. 5
Similar models for silviculture and hydrology are under development.
These are providing better planning level estimates of the biological and
physical changes occurring in response to different management regimes.
This is not to suggest that all of the biological and physical relationships
are well enough understood to permit their modeling with sufficient precision to obtain bounded predictions by their use. It does seem, however,
15. R. Holthousen & N. Dobbs, Computer Assisted Tools for Habitat Capability Evaluation (July
30, 1985) (paper presented at the Society of American Foresters National Convention, Fort Collins,
Colo.); see also, Salwasser, Overall Summary: A Manager's Perspective, in Modeling Habitat
Relationships of Terrestrial Vertebrates (1986); D. Dykstra, D. Wood, D. Young, W. Covington &
L. Garret, Teams: NorthernArizonaUniversity'sTerrestrialEcosystemAnalysis andModeling System,
in Proceedings: Society of American Foresters National Convention (1987).
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that the enormous effort invested by the Forest Service in the past round
of forest planning will provide a much more knowledgeable environment
in which to address future planning efforts.
When we consider the related task of estimating the economic values
of the biophysical results from increments in management inputs, we
have another large area for improvement. Without the information on the
biological or physical output response to increments in management inputs, it is very difficult to evaluate the economics of alternative management regimes. With improvement in estimating the biophysical production
relations, however, the economic evaluation will also improve.
Making FORPLAN a more useful model requires: 1) modification of
the model's structure to better address the locationally specific features
that need to be considered, and 2) increased attention to the early years
in the planning process with much less detailed attention to the off decades. These could achieve substantial improvement by revealing meaningful options that should be considered. 6 Such improvements are likely
to be available without proportional increases in cost.
The completed round of forest planning, however, has cost far more
than anyone had expected. Accordingly, the question of improved analyses must be considered in terms of whether indicated improvements in
forest plans would be incorporated in actual management activities. This
cannot be taken for granted because the appropriations process tends to
move along a separate track, largely inconsistent with the effort to improve
management on the forest level.
When the annual budget proposals are initially prepared at the forest
level, the most defensible projects or programs are advanced from the
field. When the budget proposals that are aggregated at the regional level
arrive in Washington, the budgetary proposal for the National Forest
System is converted from a program-based budget format into a line item
format and codes, as required of the Washington Office by the Department
of Agriculture, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the
relevant Congressional Appropriations Subcommittee. They are referred
to as Appropriations and Function codes. While the field-level budget
and budgetary codes are directly related to activities that are performed
on the forests in undertaking projects, the Appropriations and Function
codes differ markedly in concept and viewpoint. The conversion of budget
data from the operating codes used in the field to the Appropriations and
Functions base and then back again is less than a satisfactory exercise.
16. M. Bowes, Temporal Aggregation in Forplan Linear Programs, Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper ENR89-03 (1989); M. Bowes, Some Thoughts on Multiple Use Forest Planning
(July 30, 1985) (paper presented at the Society of American Foresters National Convention, Fort
Collins, Colo.); D. Dykstra, D. Wood, D. Young, W. Covington & L. Garret, supra note 15
(providing a similar view regarding the emphasis of analysis on spatial specificity and eariy neriod
detail).
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There is a problem in translating codes among conceptually different

bases. There is the additional problem of preserving identity of the projects
as budgets are aggregated and converted in their migration upwards from
the forest, subjected to revision, and then disaggregated to be passed

back down again.
What is even more important than the problems that occur in aggregating and disaggregating of budgets is that appropriations by line item
are insensitive to jointness in production between program outputs appearing as separate budget line items. As a result, it has been and will
continue to be largely coincidental if the production targets and budgets

disaggregated to the field level from Appropriation and Function line
items bear any close resemblance to the set of program components

developed at the forest level by the forest plans. The individual forests'
production targets, personnel complement, and funding ceilings, derived

from the budget and appropriations process are usually, if not always,
inconsistent with the forest level plans and proposals, and sometimes
even with feasible production possibilities at the forest level. Our observations to this effect are corroborated by a General Accounting Office
publication, 7 results of a Washington Office Forest Service investiga-

tion,'8 and communications among forest planners and operations research
analysts on the electronic bulletin board of the Forest Service's computerized communications network. 9
It thus seems clear that after enacting the Renewable Resources Planning Act and the National Forest Management Act, Congress provides
the means to implement its legislative handiwork in such a way as to
preclude its success. Unless there is thorough budgetary reform that encourages the budget and appropriations processes to move in concert with
the planning and management efforts, there will continue to be two very
17. The requirement to meet production targets, as evolved out of the appropriations process,
leads to an emphasis on physical production goals rather than economically oriented land management. Evidence of this is cited in an appendix accompanying a letter from the director of the General
Accounting Office:
Forest Service field personnel advised the subcommittee staff that management decisions are
based primarily on attaining the yearly timber volume goals and that their success as managers
is based on meeting these targets, not on any type of assessment involving a cost-benefit
comparison.
Letter from the director of the General Accounting Office to the Appropriations Subcommittee
Chairman, Appendix I, at 7 (April 4, 1986).
18. USDA Forest Service, Analysis of Cost and Revenues in the Timber Program of Four National
Forests (1986), echoes the observation that employee incentives tend to lead away from rather than
toward economically oriented management behavior.
19. In a USDA Forest Service computerized bulletin board named "Rumors," we find a discussion
(USDA Fort Collins Computer Center, Rumors Message 566, December 17, 1985) addressing the
"lack of correlation between the budget allocation and the budget proposal." Further in the message
there is reference to the problem "between budget allocation and the implementation schedule of
the Forest Plan."
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different and inconsistent national forest management tracks. This is bound
to exacerbate the many frictions and conflicts that are already endemic
in a resource allocation and management system that must rely as much
on public participation decibels as on market receipts to motivate its
resource management decisions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The public lands are charged with providing a multiplicity of resource
services. Some of these are marketable; others are not. The price signals
a market gives to guide the use of private property resources in the
production of private goods are not available to the public land manager
charged with providing a mix of unmarketed resource services. Because
the market omits appropriate signals for the production of unmarketed
services, many land and resource allocation decisions rely on administrative criteria and political negotiation. When potential claimants to goods
and services cannot be excluded on grounds of willingness to pay, there
are bound to be tensions over the allocation of public land resources.
Sound economics can play a role. "Sound" means analyses that take
into account jointness in production and externalities, and interdependencies among interactive sites, in reaching management or policy prescriptions. Boilerplate resource allocation studies that don't distinguish
between models that do and do not have multiple objectives analysis
capability do a disservice to both public land policy and management,
and injure the reputation of economics.
It is important to get the economic facts and analysis right to inform
decisionmakers correctly, even if economic criteria are not the ultimate
arbiters of choice. Much in the updated legislation that directs the management of public land agencies requires that this be done. On the other
hand there is reason to question the practical effect of this legislation
unless the budget and appropriations process can be reformed to keep
improved planning and management from being nullified by an archaic
budgeting and appropriations process.

